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Departing from the welfarist tradition, recent theories of justice focus
on individual opportunities as the appropriate standard for distributive
judgments. Justice is seen as requiring equality of opportunity, instead
of outcomes, among the individuals. To explore how this philosophical
conception can be translated into concrete public policy, we select the in-
come as relevant outcome and the income tax as the relevant redistributive
policy, and we address the following questions: (i) what is the degree of
opportunity inequality in an income distribution? (ii) how to design an
opportunity egalitarian income tax policy? Both positive and normative
criteria for ranking income distributions on the basis of equality of oppor-
tunities are derived. Moreover, we characterize an opportunity egalitarian
income tax policy and we formulate criteria for choosing among alternative
tax systems.
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11 Introduction
In de¯ning the just allocations of a given amount of resources, in general theories
of justice require equality of individuals with respect to some variable. However
they di®er from each other in the answer to the question: \equality of what?"
Following Kolm [17], the use of the descriptive concept of equality is a requirement
of internal rationality of a theory; whereas the choice of the relevant \space", in
which equality among individuals has to be assessed, can be seen as the ethical
or normative moment characterizing di®erent theories of justice.
We can distinguish two extreme and opposite cases in this. First, we have the
\Full Process Liberalism" (on this, see Kolm [17]), according to which the equality
of formal opportunities is a necessary and su±cient condition for distributive
justice. Equality of formal opportunities means that there is no legal bar to access
to all positions and advantages. An example of this position is the Entitlements
theory of Nozick [22]. The opposite case arises when equality is to be assessed in
the space of welfare, utility or, in general, preference satisfaction; it is the case of
the welfarist tradition. A third alternative position can be found in contemporary
theories of justice which require equality to be assessed in a space that is situated
in between the two polar cases presented above: Rawls [25], who ¯rst focused
on the problem of choosing the correct space, proposes primary goods; Sen [30],
[31];[32] proposes capabilities to function; Dworkin [9];[10] proposes resources;
Cohen [8] proposes access to advantage; Arneson [2], ¯nally, proposes opportunity
for welfare.
What the proposals of Rawls, Dworkin, etc. share, is the common feature that
the justice is seen as requiring equality of opportunities among the individuals, an
opportunity being \a chance of getting a good if one seeks it" (Arnerson [2], p.85).
The idea is that the equitability of a given distribution of outcomes1 cannot be
judged by observing only the degree of inequality present in that distribution. We
need to extend the informational basis of our distributive judgements; we need
information about the circumstances in which a given distribution arose. The
same inequality in a distribution of outcomes can be sometimes judged equitable,
sometimes not, depending on these circumstances.
What the principle of justice requires is not equality of individuals' ¯nal
achievements; once the means or opportunities to reach a valuable outcome have
been equally split, which particular opportunity, from those open to her, the in-
dividual chooses, is outside the scope of justice. In particular, the proposals of
Dworkin, Cohen and Arneson, use the concept of individual responsibility and
try to deduce from this the speci¯c relevant equalizandum. Are to be considered
opportunities all factors, in°uencing the individual ¯nal outcome, for which the
1In this introduction we use indi®erently the expressions "individual ¯nal outcome" or "in-
dividual advantage", to express the idea of any person's ¯nal achievment which is valuable to
her.
2individual is not responsible.
Now, how to select in a precise way the factors which constitute external
opportunities and those which are individual responsible choices? As it is evi-
dent, the central theoretical point, and consequently the main point of divergence
among competing theories, is to decide where to draw the line. The main diver-
gence concerns the status of individual preferences. Are they within or beyond
the individual responsibility? Dworkin argues that justice requires equality of
resources, and that preferences are irrelevant, in the sense that they are within
the individual responsibility; his favourite examples involve the presence of ex-
pensive tastes. Whereas in Cohen and Arneson 's view the relevant cut is not
between resources on the one hand and preferences on the other, but between
factors within and outside the individual control. Hence, one has to consider
the process whereby individual preferences are generated and, in particular, the
presence of adaptive or endogenous preferences: individual tastes themselves can
be partly determined by the external environment. An exhaustive discussion of
the various positions within the opportunity egalitarian theories is surely beyond
the object of this work.
The purpose of this paper is not to de¯ne the proper domain of individual
responsibility; rather, we consider tools which could be applicable to such a dis-
cussion. Hence the focus will be on the development of techniques which can
be of some utility for the implementation of a concrete public policy inspired by
the opportunity egalitarian ethics; whatever the de¯nition of responsibility and
opportunity a society decides to adopt.
Now, the choices that are likely to confront an opportunity egalitarian pol-
icy maker will involve the evaluation of di®erent public policies on the basis of
the opportunity redistribution they introduce, which in turn requires comparing
situations where individuals have di®erent opportunities. Hence, if we want to
give operational content to the opportunity egalitarianism, we have to address
the following issues: (i) how to measure the degree of inequality present in a
distribution of opportunities? (ii) what redistribution mechanisms intended to
increase the degree of 'opportunity equality'?
A natural answer, for the redistribution problem, would consist in equalizing
the individual opportunity sets and, once this equalization is achieved, in letting
the individuals choose from their opportunity set their preferred option2. This
solution corresponds to performing a direct exercise of measurement of inequality
in a distribution of opportunity sets3 (in this direction are, for instance, the
contributions by Alergi and Nieto [1], Herrero [16], Kranich [18], [19], Ok and
Kranich [23]).
This approach is surely correct in principle; however, given the high levels of
2This is basically the program proposed by Dworkin [10].
3For a recent survey of the relevant literature, with attention also to the related issue of
ranking opportunity sets, see Peragine [24]
3measurability and comparability of opportunities required, it seems unlikely to
be useful for operational purposes. In addition to the measurability limitations,
consider that the elements entering a person's opportunity set will be, in general,
social circumstances as well as individual native talents. Hence, it is likely that
some of these opportunities are ¯xed, personal and cannot be redistributed.
These implementability constraints motivate an indirect approach to the op-
portunity egalitarian project, where the focus is not on the distribution (and
redistribution) of opportunities "per se"; rather, it is on the consequences of a
given distribution of opportunities on some form of individual advantage. A con-
sistent reformulation of the opportunity egalitarian principle (OEP), could be
the following: Inequalities in a given distribution of outcomes, which are due
to di®erences in factors beyond the individual control (opportunities), are to be
considered inequitable and are to be compensated; whereas inequalities, due to
factors within the personal responsibility, are equitable and are not to be com-
pensated.
According to this formulation, what we object to, on the basis of opportu-
nity egalitarianism, is not the inequality in the distribution of factors beyond
the individual control (the opportunity set) \per se"; rather, we object to the
consequences of these inequalities on something which is valuable for us (some
form of individual advantage). That is to say, we object to inequalities, in a given
distribution of advantage, which are caused by inequalities in opportunities.
Consequently, considering in a uni¯ed perspective both the measurement and
the redistribution issue, in this paper we adopt an indirect, pragmatic approach.
We ¯rst address the question of how to measure inequalities, in a distribution of
outcome, which are due to di®erences in factors beyond the individual responsi-
bility. Or, more generally, how to rank di®erent "outcome distributions" on the
basis of opportunity inequality. As for the prescriptive side of the analysis, we
seek a public policy which compensates people for the outcome inequalities due
to di®erences in opportunities, without interfering with the inequalities due to
responsible choices.
The study of an opportunity egalitarian policy in formal economic models has
been made, in particular, by Bossert [5], Bossert and Fleurbaey [6], Bossert et
al. [7], Fleurbaey [11], [12], [13], Fleurbaey and Maniquet [14], Roemer [26], [27],
[28].
One way of addressing the previous questions can be illustrated by the fol-
lowing (informal) argument. Consider a given population and a distribution of
a particular form of advantage (income, utility, etc.). The advantage, for each
individual, is causally determined by two classes of factors: factors beyond the
individual's responsibility (or opportunities) and factors for which the individual
is responsible. Now partition the population into types, a type being the group of
people endowed with the same set of opportunities. Since the individual advan-
tage is determined only by opportunities and responsibility, then, by de¯nition,
any outcome inequality observed within a type can be unambiguously attributed
4to di®erences in the responsibility exercised. According to the OEP such inequal-
ities are equitable and not to be compensated at the bar of justice; for, if they
were, the individual responsibility would be denied. On the other hand, between-
types outcome inequalities (a concept, this, to be precisely de¯ned yet) can be
interpreted as re°ecting inequalities in opportunities.
Hence, roughly speaking, the focus of concern of an analysis on equality of
opportunity becomes the measurement and the reduction of inequality, in terms
of the selected outcomes, among di®erent types.
To explain in details the strategy we propose, it is time to introduce a more
formal model.
1.1 A formal model of equality of opportunities for in-
come
We start our formal analysis by selecting the income as the relevant outcome.
Income is a particularly useful example because much of actual redistributive
policy in contemporary welfare states is designed in terms of income tax and
income constitutes the standard basis for the measurement of economic inequality.
The population is represented by a ¯nite set N of individuals. Each individ-
ual's income x;x 2 X; is causally determined by two kinds of factors: factors be-
yond the individual control, represented by a person's opportunity set O;O 2 -;
and factors for which the individual is fully responsible, represented by a scalar
variable w;w 2 W: Hence we have:
x = g(O;w)
where the function g is the same for all individuals.
Income x is supposed to be continuously distributed, with cumulative distri-
bution function F (x) and X = [0;z].
A person's opportunity set O is observable; and we next assume that there is






2 < ::: < O
i < ::: < O
nª
so that, in general, we have: Oi < Oi+1:
The responsibility variable w is unobservable. Individuals have the same
degree of access to the same set of responsible choices W; and the individual
income function g is supposed to be increasing in the responsibility variable.
Following Bossert [5] and Bossert and Fleurbaey [6], in our model the dis-
tribution of both O and w is not altered by the public policy enforced; that is,
income is perfectly transferable. This is a quite natural assumption for the oppor-
tunities, especially if one thinks to the native talents as an important element of
5the individual opportunity set. As for the responsibility variable, the assumption
could be justi¯ed by thinking that it would be hardly acceptable to held a person
fully responsible for w; were this variable depending on the public policy.
The next step is to partition the population into types, where each type de-
notes the subset of the total population N having the same opportunity set: for
O 2 -; a type is the set of individuals i such that Oi = O: Within each type
there will be a distribution of income Fi (x); with density function fi(x) and
population ni.
Consider any individual k;k 2 Oi; who is endowed with opportunity Oi and,
after exercising responsibility wk; ends up with ex-post income xi
k = g(Oi;wk):











and the residual terms rk are such that, within each type i;
R
rfi(x)dx = 0:
Now consider that, once we have included in the speci¯cation of the type all
relevant factors beyond a person control, the di®erences in the income level among
people in the same type are, by de¯nition, within their own responsibility. Every
individual in a given type i;i 2 (1;:::;n) is endowed with the same opportunity
set Oi. However, di®erent individuals will make di®erent choices, will exercise
di®erent degrees of responsibility and therefore will end up with di®erent income
levels; we interpret such income di®erences as completely determined by their
own autonomous choices. Hence, we identify the within types income inequality
with inequality in the responsibility exercised by the persons in that type.
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to interpret the average income
reached within each type, as a characteristic of the type itself; that is to say
that the average income is determined, within each type, by the common endow-
ment of opportunity.
To express formally these ideas, we now introduce a crucial assumption say-









+ r (wk) (2)
In words, we assume the expected income ¹i, which is the same for all the
individuals in each type, to be a function of the opportunity set; whereas the
residual part rk is determined by the responsibility exercised.
4A similar assumption of additively separability of the income (or outcome) function in
responsible and non responsible characteristics, plays a fundamental role in Bossert [5]'s and
Fleurbaey [11]'s models.
6Consequently, all the income di®erentials observed in the same type, due to
variation in the residual term rk; are to be considered equitable and not to be
compensated; whereas, di®erentials in the \mean terms"¹i, due to di®erentials
in opportunities, are inequitable and to be compensated.
Notice that we are assuming all individuals to have the same degree of access
to the same set of possible responsible choices W, independent from the oppor-
tunities they are endowed with; given Assumption 1, this implies that equalizing
the mean incomes across types ensures that the level of ex-post income a person
can reach for any given choice of will is the same as for any other individual. To
quote Arneson ([2], p. 84), \people are able to attain identical welfare levels with
the same e®ort".
Considering that the opportunity set is intended as the set of factors in°u-
encing ab origine the individual chances to gain income, it seems reasonable to
assume that those individuals with lower opportunity set have, in average, a lower
income than those with higher opportunities; on the other hand, the function r
is supposed to be a strictly increasing function of the responsibility exercised.
Recalling that 8i 2 (1;2;:::;n);Oi < O1+1 we have the following
Assumption 2:
8k 2 O
i;8i 2 (1;:::;n); (3)
r









Let us denote by ª the set of distributions constructed as above.
It is evident that, in the framework we have introduced, the focus of concern
of an analysis on equality of opportunity is the distribution of the type-means: we
can compare any two income distributions F, G 2 ª, on the basis of opportunity
inequality, by comparing the inequality present in their relevant mean distribu-
tions; analogously, an opportunity egalitarian public policy will be intended to
decrease the degree of income inequality present in the mean distribution.
Denoting by nF
i the population in type i of distribution F, and by 1F
i the
unit vector of length nF
i , we can formally de¯ne the types-mean distribution OF;













2 < ::: < O
i < ::: < O
nª
:
Moreover, notice that Assumption 2 implies that the type mean distribution OF;
obtained from any F(x) 2 ª; is ordered:
¹
F
1 < ::: < ¹
F
i < ::: < ¹
F
n:
The exposition in the rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we
address the problem of ranking income distributions in terms of equality of op-
portunity. The characterization of an opportunity egalitarian income tax policy,
7and the discussion of criteria for choosing among alternative tax systems, are con-
tained in section 3; in the same section we address the problems of measuring the
Horizontal Inequity (3.1) and the opportunity redistribution (3.2) introduced by
an income tax. Section 4 provides concluding comments; the Appendix contains
the proofs of the theorems.
2 Measuring income inequality due to opportu-
nity inequality
We consider in this section the problem of ranking income distributions on the
basis of \equality of opportunities".
In the standard, unidimensional problem of ranking income distributions on
the basis of \income equality", the fundamental theorem of inequality economics
states that (Hardy-Littlewood-Polya): one distribution of income Lorenz domi-
nates another income distribution having the same mean if and only if the former
can be obtained from the latter by a ¯nite sequence of equalizing transfers, and
if and only if the former is ranked higher than the latter by all inequality averse
social welfare functionals.
We want to formulate an analogue of this theorem in the di®erent context
of opportunity inequality. To this end, we have ¯rst to formulate in this new
framework the concepts of Lorenz partial ordering, of equalizing transfer and of
inequality averse social evaluations functions.
Then we try to obtain a more complete ordering to rank a list of income
distributions on the basis of opportunity equality.
We ¯rst develop our analysis by assuming that the relevant income distribu-
tions have the same types partition; however, later in the paper this assumption
will be relaxed.
2.1 The Opportunity Lorenz Partial Ordering
Consider two income distributions F;G 2 ª: We have denoted the mean income
of type i in distribution F as ¹i
F , and the population size in i by ni , so that
pi =
ni
N is the population share in type i (remember we are assuming an equal
type partition for F and G). Analogous notation for distribution G.
The ordinary Lorenz partial ordering (<L) applied to the mean distributions
OF and OG obtained respectively from F (x) and G(x); is de¯ned as:
























8Moreover, the ordinary Generalized Lorenz partial ordering (<GL) applied to
the mean distributions OF and OG is de¯ned as:












i(x)dx;8k 2 (1;:::;n): (6)
We can now de¯ne the Opportunity Lorenz partial ordering (<OL) and the
Opportunity Generalized Lorenz partial ordering (<OGL):
De¯nition 1 For any F(x);G(x) 2 ª; the ordering induced by <OL is de¯ned
as follows:
F(x) <OL G(x) () OF <L OG; (7)
and the ordering induced by <OGL is de¯ned as follows:
F(x) <OGL G(x) () OF(x) <GL OG(x): (8)
That is, one income distribution Lorenz Dominates (Generalized Lorenz Dom-
inates) another in opportunity terms if and only if the mean distribution of the
former Lorenz dominates (Generalized Lorenz Dominates) the mean distribution
of the latter.
2.2 Opportunity Equalizing Transfer Ordering
We aim to formulate an analog of the \principle of equalizing transfer" of the
income inequality measurement theory. To this end, one needs ¯rst to de¯ne the
concept of equalizing transfer in the current context. The relevant variable in
terms of which to decide who are the richer agents and thus from which agents a
transfer should be made is of course the opportunity set. Therefore, any agent k,
with k 2 Oi+1; is considered to be \richer" (in opportunity terms) than another
agent h, with h 2 Oi; because Oi < Oi+1; regardless of their relevant income
levels. This has two implications: ¯rst, the equalizing transfer has to be thought
as a transfer from one (rich) type to another (poor) type; second, all persons in
the same type are equally rich (or poor) in opportunity terms, hence they have
to be treated equally. Hence, an Opportunity Equalizing Transfer (OET) is
a transfer of income which has to satisfy the principle of progressivity between
types; as for the equal treatment of people in the same type, we can formulate
two di®erent solutions.
The ¯rst amounts to require anonymity within each type, and is the case of
lump sum transfers for individual in the same type.
Formally, consider two types i;j with Oi ￿ Oj: An OET (in the "lump sum"
version) is a quantity of income ¢ > 0; with the relevant vector diui (where
9di = ¢
ni and ui is the unit vector of length ni) such that the new types-mean
incomes are:
~ ¹i = ¹i + di = ¹i +
¢
ni
~ ¹j = ¹j ¡ dj = ¹j ¡ ¢
nj
(9)
with ~ ¹i ￿ ~ ¹j (it is a rank-preserving equalizing transfer):
Given the anonymity requirement, this is equivalent to say that
~ xi
k = xi





h ¡ dj;8h 2 Oj
We can notice that the quantity ¢ is the total (equal) amount transferred
from the rich type to the poor one; however, the quantity received (given) by (to)
each individual di di®ers according to the type population ni: Considering any
two types i;j we have that di = dj nj
ni .
The second solution to the treatment of people in the same type amounts to
require proportionality within types, and we require equal average transfer for
individuals in the same type. Formally, denoting again by ¢ the total transfer
from a type to another, we now require the transfer to/from a person k in type i
(call this individual transfer ai




















Thus, if the mean income of type i before the equalizing transfer is ¹i , the











Hence, considering two types i;j 2 (1;2;:::;n); with Oi ￿ Oj; an OET (in
the "proportionality" version) is a quantity of income ¢ > 0; with the relevant
transfer to/from an individual k in type i being the already de¯ned ai
k , and such
that the new types-mean incomes are:





k = ¹i + ¢
ni











with ~ ¹i ￿ ~ ¹j: Clearly, the lump sum and the proportional versions of OETs
have exactly the same e®ect on the mean distribution; they di®er each other only









after an OET involving types i and j; the new distribution will be









Distribution O ~ F di®ers from distribution OF by a single Opportunity Equaliz-
ing Transfer; moreover, we say that distribution O ~ F is more \opportunity equal"
than distribution OF: We can extend this idea by saying that by going from one
distribution OF to another OG; by a ¯nite sequence of OETs so de¯ned, we re-
duce the opportunity inequality. We can now formally de¯ne the binary relation
"is obtained by a ¯nite sequence of opportunity egalitarian transfers" (<OET).
De¯nition 2 For any equal means income distributions F(x);G(x) 2 ª the
ordering induced by <OET is de¯ned as follows:
F(x) <OET G(x)
if and only if the Opportunity Distribution OF can be obtained from the Op-
portunity Distribution OG by means of a ¯nite sequence of OET's.
2.3 Opportunity Egalitarian SEF
In this section, we seek a Social Evaluation Function (SEF) expressing the Op-
portunity Egalitarian Principle, in order to rank a list of income distributions on
the basis of opportunity equality. Consider the following additive, individualistic









where Ui(x) is the social planner's imposed advantage function for type i, fi(x)
is the income density function in type i, and pi =
ni
N is the population share in
type i. Recall that we are assuming a discrete distribution for the opportunity
sets Oi; on the contrary, income is continuously distributed, and we assume that
the advantage function Ui(x) is twice di®erentiable (almost everywhere) in the
variable x:
We now try to capture the basic intuition beyond the opportunity egalitarian
ethics, by restricting the class of social planner's imposed advantage functions.
Hence we introduce three crucial conditions on the functions Ui(x) in order to
characterize the family of Opportunity Egalitarian SEFs. First, we assume that




¸ 0;8i 2 (1;2;:::;n);8x 2 X:
11Hence condition C:1, which is a common monotonicity assumption, guar-
antees that social welfare increases as a result of an income increment.
Next, we assume that our SEF is indi®erent to income inequality due to
individual responsibility; that is, for income inequality within the same type. We
require within-type income inequality neutrality:
(C:2)
d2Ui(x)
dx2 = 0;8i 2 (1;2;:::;n);8x 2 X
This conditions says that, for ¯xed Oi; that is, when focusing on the group of
people having the same opportunity set, the welfare gain resulting from a given
total extra income, however distributed, is constant. Hence, a reduction in income
inequality within a type, which leaves the mean income of the type unchanged,
has no welfare e®ects. This welfare condition corresponds to the requirement of
within types anonymity in the de¯nition of an Opportunity Egalitarian Transfer.
Next, we want to formulate a condition expressing the aversion to inequal-
ity in the opportunity distribution. Inequality-aversion is usually expressed by
assuming concavity of the utility function in the relevant variable. But the op-
portunity (actually, the expected income) distribution is a discrete distribution.
Hence we seek an analog, in the discrete case, of the concavity assumption usu-
ally employed in the continuous case. The condition expressing between-types







;8i 2 (1;2;:::;n);8x 2 X
which says that the marginal increase in welfare due to an increment of income,
is a decreasing function of opportunity. Actually, in case of a continuum of
opportunity types i and fully di®erentiable utility function U (x;i), condition
C.2 requires that the cross derivatives be non-positive. Condition (C:3) is a
fundamental assumption which implies that a transfer of income from a richer to
a poorer type (in opportunity terms), at a given income level, is welfareimproving.
De¯ning the class of SEF which satisfy conditions (C.1) to (C.3) as SEFOE;
we have the following
De¯nition 3 For any F(x);G(x) 2 ª; the ordering induced by <OEF is
de¯ned as follows:
F(x) <OEF G(x) () WF ¸ WG 8W 2 SEFOE: (15)
Some further remarks are in order with respect to the social evaluation func-
tion we are employing. It as an additive, individualistic and symmetric function.
Now, considering the conditions (C:1 to C:3) we have introduced, we can ask: is
the SEF we are employing a standard utilitarian one?
12A fundamental component of utilitarianism, welfarism, requires that any so-
cial state be evaluated on the basis of (and only on the basis of) individual
utilities. Any other variable can be considered relevant only in an instrumental
sense: that is, only in its contribution to the individual utility. On the other
hand, the opportunity egalitarian approach claims to be non-welfarist. Two rea-
sons can justify the non-welfarist character of the opportunity approach. One
is the fact that the individual's relevant advantages considered in the opportu-
nity approach typically are not interpreted as individual utilities. However, this
distinction is more semantic than substantial. The notion of utility used in eco-
nomics is su±ciently °exible to be interpreted as any notion of individual valuable
outcome.
The other factor, which distinguishes in a substantial sense the opportunity
approach from welfarism, is the fact that, in the former, information about the
individual's achievement does not su±ce for comparing alternative social states
for normative appraisal. Knowledge of the individual ex-ante opportunities is also
important; better, opportunities are intrinsically important. Now, the individual
advantage function (U) we are using, de¯ned over individual income and oppor-
tunity set (U = U(x;Oi)); is not to be thought as an individual's utility function.
In other words, we do not argue that the actual individual utility (or welfare)
depends upon both the income and the opportunity level5; for this would imply
to give an instrumental value to the opportunity, hence to make the opportunity
approach consistent with welfarism. Rather, U is the evaluation function used
by the social planner to evaluate a given social state from the distributive justice
point of view: both the income an the opportunity levels are considered to be
relevant for equity judgments purposes. It could well be the case that two persons
with equal income, but with di®erent ex-ante opportunity sets, get exactly the
same level of welfare. Nevertheless, their situations are normatively di®erent; for
the relevant variable we are employing in distributive judgements is not welfare
but opportunity. Hence, we are entering non-welfare information (namely, in-
formation about the ex-ante distribution of opportunities) in evaluating a social
state; which is inconsistent with welfarism, hence with utilitarianism.
2.4 Equivalence results
We are now ready to obtain unambiguous social rankings of income distributions,
based on the opportunity egalitarian principles. First we obtain that a given
income distribution F(x) is superior to another income distribution G(x) on the
basis of opportunity egalitarianism, if and only if the mean income distribution of
5From this speci¯cation it follows that, even if analytically similar to the "di®erences in
needs" approach to the measurement of income inequality (see, in particular, Atkinson and
Bourguignon [4], and the related literature), the current approach is very di®erent in its eco-
nomic meaning.
13F(x) (the indirect expression of the opportunity distribution) Generalized Lorenz
Dominates (Lorenz Dominates) the Expected income distribution of G(x).
Theorem 1 For any F(x);G(x) 2 ª the ordering induced by <OGL is the same
as the ordering induced by <OEF :
Proof. [In the appendix]
Therefore, if F(x) and G(x) have the same total income, then the ordering
induced by <OL is the same as the ordering induced by <OEF :
Theorem 1 can be seen as a modi¯ed form of Second Degree Stochastic Dom-
inance in a two-dimensional setting, with the assumption that one dimension
(opportunity) is only ordinally measurable. Analogously to the Atkinson (1970)
theorem, it gives normative signi¯cance to the statistic-descriptive concept of
Lorenz Dominance; the normative judgment being now based on the opportunity
egalitarian ethics, instead of the utilitarian one (as in Atkinson).
Next we obtain that an income distribution Lorenz dominates another in
opportunity terms if and only if, the former can be obtained from the latter by
means of a ¯nite sequence of opportunity equalizing transfers (OET's).
Theorem 2 For any equal means income distributions F(x);G(x) 2 ª; the or-
dering induced by <OL is the same as the ordering induced by <OET :
Proof. [In the appendix]
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 yield the main result of this paper, which can be
seen as the analogue of the fundamental theorem of inequality economics, in the
current context of opportunity inequality: one distribution of income opportunity
Lorenz dominates another income distribution having the same mean if and only
if the former can be obtained from the latter by a ¯nite sequence of opportunity
equalizing transfers, and if and only if the former is ranked higher than the latter
by all opportunity inequality averse SEFs.
Theorem 3 For any equal means income distributions F(x);G(x) 2 ª; the fol-
lowing statements are equivalent:
(i) F(x) <OL G(x);
(ii) F(x) <OET G(x);
(iii) F(x) <OEF G(x):
2.5 An extension to distributions with di®erent type par-
titions
In this section we extend the dominance conditions derived in Theorem 1 to the
case of distribution of income which have di®erent type-partitions. This extension
is of great importance in empirical applications. In fact, if the assumption of
14equal partition is appropriate when comparing distributions which refer to the
same population but observed in di®erent moments in time, it is inadequate
when observing di®erent population. For instance, when we want to compare
the degree of opportunity inequality of di®erent countries, or we want to assess
secular trends in the distribution for a country.
We keep the same de¯nition of Opportunity Lorenz partial ordering and the
relevant Generalized version. As for the SEF, we need to introduce an additional
assumption on the type advantage function. More precisely we consider the same











where, of course, now the population share pi
F varies with the distribution. To the
conditions C:1 ¡ C:3 already introduced and characterizing the family SEFOE;




where z is the maximum income level in each type. By introducing condition
(C:4), the advantage functions Ui(x) cease to be ordinal: any a±ne transforma-
tion such as, for example, Ui ! ai + bUi , now is supposed to be able to a®ect
the results of social comparisons. This requirement is necessary in a context with
di®erent types population. Condition C:4 implies the extension of our result.
Let the set of SEF's satisfying conditions C:1 to C:4 be denoted by SEF¤
OE; and
the relevant ordering (analogous of De¯nition 3) be denoted by <OEF¤: Then we
obtain the following:
Theorem 4 For any F(x) and G(x) 2 ª;the ordering induced by <OGL is the
same as the ordering induced by <OEF¤ :
Proof. [In the appendix]
Hence, unambiguous social rankings are achieved if, and only if, one distribu-
tion Generalized Lorenz dominates, in opportunity terms, another.
2.6 Complete Ordering
In this section we aim to obtain a criterion to rank a list of income distributions
on the basis of \equality of opportunities", which is more complete than the ones
developed in the previous sections.
According to the assumptions introduced in the previous sections, we can
say that the within-types inequality is to be interpreted as inequality due to
individual responsibility; whereas, the inequality in the distribution of types-
mean income (or individual expected income), which is no other that the between
types inequality, surely re°ects opportunity inequality.
15Hence, we want to distinguish the Overall Inequality (OI) observed in a given
distribution F 2 ª into: within-types inequality (W) and between-types inequal-
ity (B). We can use a Path Independent (Foster - Shneyerov [15]) measure of
inequality (call it I); which is a relative index of inequality that can be decom-
posed as follow:
OI = B + W:
The terms B and W are calculated in the following way:
² B = I
¡
FB¢
is given by the measure applied to the Smoothed Distribution
FB which replaces each income in a type with its representative income;
² W = I (Fw) is given by the measure applied to the Standardized Distri-















The interpretation in the current context is as follows. The Smoothed Dis-
tribution FB, obtained by replacing each income with its type mean income ¹i;
is no other than the distribution obtained by eliminating, at each income level
xi
k; the residual (responsibility) term rk: Hence the inequality index applied to




is our indirect index of opportunity inequality.
On the other hand, by rescaling all types distributions until all types have
the same mean income (let us call it ¹), we are left with a distribution in which
the only inequality present is that due to di®erences in rk; that is to individual















represents that part of income inequality due to individual
responsibility, which has not to be taken into account when measuring the op-
portunity inequality.
Therefore, considering any two income distributions F, G 2 ª, we' ll say
that the distribution F exhibits a lower degree of opportunity inequality than










If the index I we are employing is a relative index of inequality, which satis¯es
the scale invariance property (the measure is not a®ected by equiproportionate
16changes in all incomes), then I
¡
F B¢
satis¯es the Principle of Opportunity Equal-
izing Transfer, in its proportionality version. In fact, by de¯nition, an OET
applied to a given distribution X:
(i) reduces the inequality present in the relevant types mean distribution (due
to the requirement of progressivity between types);
(ii) leaves the inequality within types unchanged (due to the requirement of
equal average transfer across individuals in the same type).








On the other hand, if we use an absolute index of inequality IA, which is




of Opportunity Equalizing Transfer, in its lump sum version.
3 Opportunity Redistribution by the Income Tax
In this section we consider the problem of de¯ning a redistributive public policy
inspired by theopportunity egalitarian ethics. Given the case of non-transferability
of the individual opportunities and full transferability of income, we do not seek a
mechanism to redistribute opportunities; rather, we try to characterize an income
policy which compensates individuals for income inequalities due to di®erences
in endowments of opportunities, without interfering with the inequalities due to
autonomous choices.
Considering the previous analysis of opportunity inequality, it is natural to use
the Lorenz criterion in comparing the income inequality in the pre the post-tax
distributions; therefore, we can say that an opportunity redistributive public pol-
icy is a tax policy T such that, after its application to a given income distribution
F 2 ª, the post-tax distribution FT :
1. Lorenz dominates, in opportunity terms, the pre-tax distribution F;
2. exhibits the same degree of inequality, according to the Lorenz criterion, as
the pre tax distribution F; within any type i;i 2 (1;:::;n):
In more formal terms, denoting by 3L the Lorenz partial ordering applied to
any two type i distributions Fi and Gi; i 2 (1;:::;n); belonging respectively to
distribution F;G 2 ª; and recalling the de¯nition of Opportunity Lorenz partial
ordering (<OL) given in section 2.1;we can introduce the following
De¯nition 4 A tax policy T is an Opportunity Redistributive Tax Policy if
and only if,
8F 2 ª;8i 2 (1;:::;n); F
i ¼L F
i
T & FT <OL F:
We now seek some normatively meaningful conditions in order to characterize
an opportunity redistributive tax system.
17In designing an equitable tax system, two basic principles are usually em-
ployed: the Vertical Equity (V E) and the Horizontal Equity (HE) principle. In
this section we aim to reformulate these fundamental rules on the light of the Op-
portunity Egalitarian Ethics, and then to design a tax policy which is consistent
with them.
The Horizontal Equity Principle (HE) requires the equal treatment of
equals. Giving operative meaning to this command requires to de¯ne in a precise
way the concepts of \equals" and of \equal treatment".
In the current context, it seems natural to evaluate the \equal position" in
terms of opportunity: are \equals", in a normative sense, individuals with equal
opportunities. Hence the HE rule in the present context refers to the treatment
of people belonging the same type. If, consistent with the proportionality version






and letting T i


















Thus, an income tax T (x;i) re°ecting Axiom 1 (HE) should be proportional
within each type:







= 0 : (18)
Hence, the HE principle can be interpreted in this context as a command re-
quiring that the inequality in a given income distribution among people de¯ned
\equals"on the basis of a certain socially relevant characteristics, be unchanged
after the public intervention.
An alternative formulation of the HE principle would amount to require equal
payment (T) for all individuals in the same type. A formulation which would be
consistent with the lump sum version of the OET.
On the other hand, the Vertical Equity Principle requires an \appropri-
ately unequal treatment of unequals". In the current context it refers to the
appropriate di®erentiation of treatment of people with di®erent opportunities;
that is, of people belonging to di®erent types.
We interpret, as before, the "unequal treatment " as unequal average tax
rate, and require also, as part of the Vertical Equity principle, that there be no
reranking of means after the introduction of the taxes. Hence, letting ai be the




















& (1 ¡ ai)¹
i < (1 ¡ ai+1)¹
i+1:
Hence, an income tax T (x;i) re°ecting both the HE and the VE principles

















i < (1 ¡ ai+1)¹
i+1
The following result shows that Axioms HE and VE characterize the Oppor-
tunity Redistributive Tax Policy.
Theorem 5 The tax policy T satis¯es Axioms HE and VE if and only if T is an
Opportunity Redistributive Tax Policy.
Proof. [In the Appendix]
Following a similar reasoning, we can analyse the Opportunity Redistributive
Tax Policy from a normative point of view; to this end, we employ the already
de¯ned <OEF ordering. Letting T be a tax satisfying Axioms HE and VE, and
denoting by FP the post tax distribution obtained after the application of a fully
proportional tax P raising the same revenue as T, we obtain the following
Theorem 6 For any distribution F2 ª; and the proportional tax P raising the
same revenue as T, if T satis¯es HE and VE then
FT <OEF FP: (20)
Proof. [In the Appendix]
A consequence of these results is that we now have a criterion to discriminate
among alternative tax systems on the basis of a clear normative judgement. In
fact, given two tax systems T 1 and T2, with the same total revenue, we say that
T1 is preferred to T2 according to the Opportunity Egalitarian Ethics, if and
only if the post-tax distribution (FT 1) Opportunity-Lorenz dominates the post-tax
distribution (FT 2): FT 1 <OL FT 2:
We now address two di®erent important questions, both useful to fully appre-
ciate the impact of a tax system on a given distribution: ¯rst, that of measuring
violation of the Horizontal equity principle introduced by the tax; second, that
of measuring the opportunity redistribution, which is no other that the between-
types redistribution, introduced by the tax.
193.1 Measuring Horizontal Inequity
Before proposing a particular solution to the problem of measuring Horizontal
Inequity (HI), let us de¯ne in a more precise way what we mean by Horizontal
Inequity.
We have de¯ned the Horizontal Equity principle as the command requiring
equal average tax rate within each type. This implies that, within each type, the
degree of inequality present in the pre-tax distribution and that present in the
post-tax distribution obtained by using a horizontally equitable tax, be the same
according to every Lorenz-consistent inequality index (that is, every symmetric,
relative, Principle of transfer-consistent, inequality measure). According to our
de¯nition of Horizontal Equity, we cannot admit of progressive, proportional or
regressive distinctions when measuring horizontal inequity; we have to focus on
any disparity of treatment of those judged to be in the same position. More
precisely, considering a given type i, according to the de¯nition introduced, there
















or, of course, when both happens (at di®erent x).
Moreover, we have to notice that the measurement of HI implies two distinct
but interdependent levels of analysis. First, the HI as a local phenomenon: that
is, the HI experienced within each type. Second, the problem of aggregating the
local measures in an index of HI for the population as a whole. Both levels have
to be considered in order to appreciate whether a given measure is appropriate
or not.
A particular feature characterizing our scenario is that we de¯ne as \equals"
individuals with equal opportunities; that is, individual belonging the same type.
On the other and, as an e®ect of the di®erent degrees of individual responsibility
exercised, within type there will be a distribution of income; it is therefore likely
that people judged to be "equal" in a normative sense, are characterized by very
di®erent income levels. Hence, our measure of HI cannot be thought as a simple
measure of the dispersion in the post-tax incomes of those who were equals in
the pre-tax income distribution. Instead, our measure of HI has to be based on
a comparison between the degree of inequality in the post-tax distribution and
that in the pre-tax distribution. There is a class of measures, proposed by the
classical literature, which could be appropriate in the current context. Once the
relevant group of equals has been identi¯ed, the HI experienced at local level is
20measured as di®erence between the post-tax and pre-tax dispersion among the
group of equals6. Letting Ii
pre (Ii
post) be an inequality index applied to the pre-
tax (post-tax) distribution of incomes belonging the same equals group i, the




















If this methodology is satisfactory when focusing on the local level, it is not
necessarily so if we consider the aggregation issue. In fact, applying this pro-
cedure, there could be compensation across types: violations due to progressive
tax in some types, could compensate violations in the opposite direction in other
types.
Two ways of escaping this aggregation problem, and keeping the same mea-
surement solution at local level, would be that of aggregating the local measures
by using either:





















Selecting the "absolute value" solution, the application of this strategy to the
current scenario is as follow. Let Ii
x (Ii
x¡T) be any Lorenz-consistent inequal-
ity index applied to the pre-tax (post-tax) distribution of incomes of type i: A









It will be equal to zero when the degree of inequality in the pre-tax and post-tax
distributions in type i is the same; for example, when a proportional tax has
6This class of indices has been proposed as response to the identi¯cation problem, which
arises when, working with sample data, there can be very few perfect equals in the sample
of pre-tax incomes, and therefore the application of classical HI measures can produce an
under-estimation of the real HI present. In this case some authors (Lambert [20], Lambert
& Ramos, [21]) have proposed to use the notion of \close equals groups", intended as groups
of people whose incomes belong to a given range, and to measure the HI experienced at local
level as di®erence between the post-tax and pre-tax dispersion among the group of close equals.
Di®erent measures of inequality are used: the "mean logarithmic deviation", the "absolute Gini
index", and the normative "cost of inequality index" of Atkinson [3].
21been applied within the type7. It will be positive when there has been some
redistribution, either progressive or regressive, within the type; that is, when the
income tax was not proportional everywhere in the type.
As for the aggregate measure of Horizontal Inequity, we simply weight the







The index of Horizontal Inequity will be equal to zero when a proportional tax
has been applied within each type. If positive, we can say that there has been
some redistribution, either progressive or regressive, within some types.
3.2 Measuring Opportunity Redistribution
The standard way of measuring the redistributive e®ect introduced by an income
tax is that of looking at the variation in the degree of inequality from the pre
to the post-tax distribution. Hence, measuring the opportunity redistribution
introduced by an income tax corresponds, in our framework, to measuring the
reduction of inequality from the pre to the post-tax mean distribution. As the
inequality in the mean income distribution is our indirect expression of the op-
portunity inequality, the between-types redistribution is our indirect expression
of the opportunity redistribution. Having already de¯ned the Lorenz criterion,
we can use a Lorenz-based index of inequality, apply this index to the relevant
mean distribution, and express the opportunity redistribution as the di®erence
between the inequality in the post and pre-tax distribution as measured by that
index. Letting G¹ be the Gini index applied to the pre-tax mean distribution
of F, and G¹T the Gini index of the post tax mean distribution of FT, we can
express the opportunity redistribution as:
OR = G¹ ¡ G¹T (23)
which measures the reduction in the between-types inequality from the pre to
the post-tax distribution (given that there is not reranking). It will be equal to
zero when the degree of inequality in the pre-tax and post-tax mean distributions
is the same; and possibly in some other scenarios where the pre-tax and post-
tax Lorenz curves cross. If positive, there has for sure been some opportunity
redistribution.
Alternatively, we could use any additively decomposable inequality measure
I :
7A zero value of the index is not su±cient to say that a proportional tax has been applied;
this is due to the possibility of crossing of Lorenz curves before and after tax, which would not
be detected by using such index. Actually, the Lorenz dominance is equivalent to unanimity
among all the Lorenz consistent indices.
22OR = I(F)B ¡ I(F¡T)B













where the ¯rst term in the right hand side indicates the decrease in the overall
income inequality, and the second term measures the increase in the within-
types dispersion; however, as already said, the last term cannot be interpreted as
violation of the HE principle, because of potential compensations across types.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have tried to explore how an opportunity egalitarian theory of
justice can be translated into a concrete public policy. After selecting the income
as the relevant form of advantage and the income tax policy as the relevant
redistributive policy, the following questions have been addressed: i) what is the
degree of opportunity inequality in a given distribution of income? (ii) how to
design an income tax policy consistent with the opportunity egalitarian ethics?
As for the ¯rst question, dominance criteria for unambiguous social ranking of
income distributions have been proposed (section 2). In particular, an analogue
(Theorem 3) of the fundamental theorem of inequality economics in the context
of equality of opportunity has been derived.
Then (section 3), appealing properties have been formulated and used to
characterize an opportunity egalitarian income tax. Finally, solutions to the
problems of measuring the opportunity redistribution and the Horizontal Inequity
introduced by an income tax have been discussed.
It is possible to indicate (at least) three possible extensions of this work. First,
by relaxing the crucial assumption of additive separability of the income function,
therefore studying measurement techniques and redistributive policy that could
be applied to any income function;second, by considering the e®ect of taxation
on the individuals' choices of responsibility, thereby analysing the incentive prop-
erties of alternative policies; third, by considering the case of unobservable level
of responsibility.
5 Appendix
We ¯rst state and prove the following Lemma:
8This decomposition (which applies to any additively decomposable inequality measure) is
proposed by Lambert [20] in a paper concerning the measurement of Horizontal Inequity, and




vkwk ¸ 0 for all sets of numbers fvkg such that vk ¸ vk+1 ¸ 0
, 8k 2 (1;2;:::;n); if and only if
k P
i=1
wi ¸ 0 , 8k 2 (1;2;:::;n):











It is obvious that if
k P
i=1




As for the necessity part, suppose that
n P
k=1
vkwk ¸ 0 for all sets of numbers
fvkg such that vk ¸ vk+1 ¸ 0 , but 9 j 2 (1;2;:::;n) :
j P
i=1
wi < 0: Consider what
happens when (vk ¡vk+1) & 0; 8k 6= j :
n X
k=1




which is the desired contradiction.
Proof. of Theorem 1










G ;8k 2 (1;2;:::;n) () (WF ¡ WG) ¸ 0; 8 W 2 SEFOE
where:

















Using integration by parts, we obtain









i (x)dx ¸ 0
where Si(x) =
R x
0 [piG(y) ¡ piF (y)]dy:
Now, considering that, by condition (C.2),
d2Ui(x)
dx2 = 0; we obtain that:






i (z) ¸ 0:
24Considering that, by condition (C.1),
dUi(x)




dx ¸ 0; we can apply Lemma 1. Hence we obtain that (WF ¡ WG) ¸




i(z) ¸ 0 ;8k 2 (1;2;:::;n):
Considering that Si (z) = pi¹i
F ¡ pi¹i










G ;8k 2 (1;2;:::;n) () (WF ¡ WG) ¸ 0; 8 W 2 SEFOE:
Proof. of Theorem 29
That the <OET dominance implies <OL dominance, comes directly from the
de¯nition of OET and Lorenz dominance in the Opportunity distributions.
We only prove that: F(x) <OL G(x) =) F(x) <OET G(x):
First notice that we are comparing two equal mean distributions with the









and denote the mean distributions of F(x) and G(x) respectively by X and Y.
Hence in this new notation








i ;8j 2 (1;2;:::;n):
Thus we know that X <L Y , we want to show how to get X from Y by a
¯nite sequence of OET's. We consider in this proof the lump sum version of
OET. However, the proof holds also in the proportionality case. Hence, let k
be the ¯rst type where xk 6= yk: Since X <L Y then xk > yk: (Recall that the
distributions are ordered in an increasing way : xk < xk+1 and yk < yk+1):
Now obtain a new distribution ~ Y (k) by an OET (dk) which makes ~ yk (k) = xk,
so that we have
¡




= dk; and lowers the income yk+1 of
an amount dk+1 = dk nk
nk+1:
Notice that the total amount transferred from type k + 1 to type k is ¢ =





9For this proof we follow the approach of Rothschild and Stiglitz [29].
25k+1 X
i=1






j (k) = y
j;8j > k + 1
Thus, ~ Y (k) <L Y and ~ Y (k) agrees with X in k places. We can use the same
procedure to ¯nd an OET which, applied to the distribution ~ Y (k); produces a
new distribution ~ Y (k + j) <L Y and which agrees with X in k + j (¸ k + 1)
places. Continuing with this procedure, we can produce X from Y by a sequence
of (less than n) OET's.
Proof. of Theorem 4
In this case,





















Using integration by parts, we obtain









































i (x)dx ¸ 0

































































Now considering that, by condition (C.2),
d2Ui(x)
dx2 = 0; that by condition (C.4)








G = 1; we obtain:












26Now considering that, by condition (C.1),
dUi(x)




dx ¸ 0; we can apply Lemma 1 as in the proof of Theorem 1. Hence




i(z) ¸ 0 ;8k 2 (1;2;:::;n):


















G ;8k 2 (1;2;:::;n) () WF ¸ WG for all W 2 SEFOE:
Proof. of Theorem 5
First let us focus on the e®ect of the tax T on the means distribution OF.
Let FT be the post-tax distribution obtained after the application of the tax
T. We have to prove that OFT <L OF for all F 2 ª; if and only if T sat-
is¯es axioms HE and V E. Now, OF = (¹1u1;:::;¹iui;:::;¹nun) and OFT =
((1 ¡ a1)¹1u1;:::;(1 ¡ ai)¹iui;:::;(1 ¡ an)¹nun): Considering the between types
progressivity imposed by axiom V E; and the absence of reranking, the result is
ensured by the Jackobson-Fellman theorem.
As for the second claim of Theorem 5, again the Jakobsson-Fellman theorem
ensures that the within type proportionality required by axiom HE is a necessary
and su±cient condition for Fi ¼L F i
T; 8i 2 (1;:::;n):
Proof. of Theorem 6
Considering that by Theorem 5: F ¡T <OL F; and that, formally, F ¡P ¼OL
F, we obtain that
F ¡ T <OL F ¡ P:
Now, considering that, by Theorem 1, for any equal mean distributions F;G 2
ª; F <OL G () F <OEF G, we ¯nally obtain that F ¡T <OEF F ¡ P:
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